connecting*the*dots

Preface (pg. xvi)

[…]
However, just as the Christian Reformation opened the door to multiple, often conflicting, and sometimes baffling interpretations of Christianity, so has the reformation of Islam created a number of wildly divergent and competing ideologies. Perhaps it is inevitable that, as religious authority passes from institutions to individuals, there will be men and women whose radical reinterpretations of religion will be fueled by their extreme social and political agendas. In this sense, jihadists like Osama bin Laden must be understood as products of, not counters to, the Islamic Reformation. Indeed, bin Laden joins a long and unsavory list of militant puritans — whether Muslim, Christian, Jewish or Hindu — who consider themselves and their individual followers to be the only true believers, and all others to be hypocrites, imposters, and apostates who must be convinced of their folly or abandoned to their horrible fates.

Like puritans of other faiths — militaristic or not — the jihadists’ principal goals is the “purifying” of their religious communities. In other words, their first target is not the West, or Jews, or Christians, or Zionists, or Crusaders, or any other outsiders (what the jihadists term “the far enemy”), but those hundreds of millions of Muslims who do not share their puritanical worldview (”the near enemy”). Their agenda can most clearly be observed in the civil war they have launched in Iraq. For whatever else may be fueling the violence in that country, there can be little doubt that the primary aim of the jihadists who have infiltrated Iraq and who represent the most ruthless segment of the insurgency is the massacre of all those Muslims (particularly the Shi’ah majority) whom they regard as rawafida or apostates.

Of course, that is not to say that the far enemy is not a target of jihadism, as New York, Madrid, and London can testify. But it is mainly as a means to galvanize other Muslims to the jihadist cause that most of these attacks against the West should be understood. The attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, were by bin Laden’s own admission specifically designed to goad the United States into an exaggerated retaliation against the Islamic world so as to mobalize Muslims to, in the words of George W. Bush, “choose sides.”

Now, four years removed from that tragic day, perhaps the most hopeful development in this internal battle to define the faith and practice of over a billion people is that Muslims themselves are becoming increasingly aware that they are as much endangered by the extremist agenda as are the so called infidels. Thus, the day before the London bombings, one hundred seventy of the world’s leading clerics and scholars, representing every major sect and school of law in Islam, gathered in Amman, Jordan, where, in an unprecendented display of intersectarian collaboration, they issues a joint fatwa, or legal ruling, denouncing all acts of terrorism committed in the name of Islam. The Amman declaration was not only a tacit (if belated) acknowledgement of the civil war raging within Islam, it was an attempt by the clerical institutions to re-exert some measure of authority over those who have hijacked Islam for their own murderous causes.

It didn’t work. The next day, and almost as if in response to the Amman fatwa, London was attacked. Two weeks later, a bomb demolished aa hotel in the resort town of Sharm El-Sheik, Egypt, killing nearly a hundred people — many of them poor, many of them Muslim. Two weeks after that, three hundred fifty bombs tore through Bangladesh, one after the other, in a violent attempt to dislodge the country’s fledgling democratic government. After each of these attacks, a new wave of fatwas was issued, again denouncing the use of violence and terrorism in the name of Islam. And after each fatwa, the jihadists struck again. And the war goes on. Reformations, as we know from Christian history, are bloody events. And though the end is near, the Islamic Reformation has some way to go before it is resolved.