connecting*the*dots

(originally uploaded by Hawk Eyes)

Don’t you just love it how he and Bush waited until the shift in power was obvious? As if Donald Rumsfeld didn’t do a terrible job over the years — particularly with the accountability of the Abu Ghraib scandal — and that only a moderate loss of power in Congress would’ve allowed him to stay on?

Later, asshole.

Hit the road, Rummy.

Jim Lobe - Inter Press Service
New Military Offensive Against Rumsfeld

WASHINGTON - Three years after the fall of Baghdad and the city’s disastrous plunge into chaos, U.S. military brass appears engaged in a new campaign: getting rid of Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld.

While the offensive has so far been limited to generals who have recently retired from the service, they claim strong support for their views on the part of active-duty officers.

The latest demand for Rumsfeld’s resignation came Wednesday when Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who commanded the First Infantry Division in Iraq, called for a “fresh start in the Pentagon”.

“We need a leader who understands teamwork, a leader who knows to build teams, a leader that does it without intimidation,” Batiste told a CNN interviewer.

Batiste’s remarks, which follow highly public demands from three other top generals for Rumsfeld’s resignation over the past several weeks, came as public confidence in the policies of the administration of Pres. George W. Bush both in Iraq and in the more general “war on terror” has dwindled to all-time lows.

The growing perception, fueled by recent disclosures regarding the selective leaking of intelligence authorised by both Bush and Vice Pres. Dick Cheney, that the administration consciously tried to manipulate the public into supporting the Iraq war and discrediting its critics has contributed to the continuing erosion in popular support, even among Republicans.

The conviction that Rumsfeld made major strategic errors by insisting on invading Iraq with a relatively light force that proved incapable of imposing order on the country, let alone suppressing the insurgency that followed, has also taken hold, particularly after last month’s publication by two New York Times reporters of an authoritative account of the war, “Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq”.

Based on extensive interviews with both retired and active-duty officers who took part in the war, the book found that Rumsfeld and his top aides believed that Washington could “oust a dictator, usher in a new era in Iraq, (and) shift the balance of power in the Middle East in the United States’s favour” on the cheap and that the war “would suddenly be brought to an end when the regime’s ministries were seized and its leader toppled”.

The brass’s unease with Rumsfeld’s plans for going to war date originally from his summary dismissal in early 2003 of then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki’s testimony before Congress that the occupation of Iraq would require “several hundred thousand troops”.

Shinseki’s effective early retirement, apparently in retaliation for speaking out with such candour, was taken by most of the brass as a message from Rumsfeld that public disagreement with his views could have serious career consequences.

When, by early 2004, it had become clear that Washington had indeed not deployed sufficient troops to control Iraq, a number of retired generals began speaking out forcefully against Rumsfeld and his civilian advisers.

In May 2004, the former head of the U.S. Central Command, ret. Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, accused them of “dereliction of duty” in failing to prepare adequately for the war and called on Bush to fire them if they did not resign.

In recent weeks, Zinni has renewed those demands, stressing in various public appearances that Rumsfeld had deliberately ignored extensive contingency planning developed under his command in the late 1990s for an Iraq invasion and overruled officers who raised questions about his own plans.

In the past three weeks, he has been joined by three other retired generals, including Batiste.

In a remarkably frank New York Times column published Mar. 19, ret. Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who had been in charge of training the Iraqi military during the first year of the occupation, argued that Rumsfeld “has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally and tactically” and “has put the Pentagon at the mercy of his cold warrior’s view of the world and his unrealistic confidence in technology to replace manpower”.

“In the five years Mr. Rumsfeld has presided over the Pentagon,” Eaton wrote, “I have seen a climate of groupthink become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge the notions of the senior leadership.”

Eaton’s blast was followed this week by an anguished column in Time magazine by ret. Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, the top operations officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the invasion, who assailed the brass, including himself, for “act(ing) timidly when their voices urgently needed to be heard.”

“The consequence of the military’s quiescence,” he wrote, “was that a fundamentally flawed plan was executed for an invented war…”

“My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions — or bury the results,” he asserted, calling for the replacement of Rumsfeld “and many others unwilling to fundamentally change their approach”.

With his remarks Wednesday, Batiste, who retired from the Army in November and whose forces were based in Tikrit until last May, joined the rebellion, firmly taking Zinni’s side.

“…(W)hen decisions are made without taking into account sound military recommendations, sound military decision making, sound planning, then we’re bound to make mistakes,” he said. “You know, it speaks volumes that guys like me are speaking out from retirement about the leadership climate in the Department of Defence.”

The generals’ revolt also comes amid a tiff between Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who, during a trip to Britain last week, conceded that Washington made “tactical errors, thousands of them, I’m sure” in its invasion of Iraq. Rumsfeld replied several days later, insisting that such mistakes are inevitable in warfare.

“If someone says, well, that’s a tactical mistake, then I guess it’s a lack of understanding, at least my understanding, of what warfare is about,” he said.

In remarks before a private group in Chicago Saturday, former Secretary of State Colin Powell — a four-star general and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself — appeared to side with Rice, and with the generals.

“We made some serious mistakes in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad,” he said. “We didn’t have enough troops on the ground. We didn’t impose our will. And as a result, an insurgency got started, and …it got out of control.” He did not demand Rumsfeld’s resignation, however.

Forget the planning and tactical mistakes, if Rumsfeld gave two shits about America and our perception around the world, he would’ve resigned when the torture scandal at Abu Ghraib broke. “It happened on my watch” would’ve been the line and he could’ve at least retired with a semblance of honor and integrity.

Sorry… I just laughed up my lunch.

UPDATE: More former generals are lining up to call for Rumsfeld’s resignation.

(NO SHIT) UPDATE: Bush backs Rumsfeld:

“Earlier today I spoke with Don Rumsfeld about ongoing military operations in the global war on terror,” the president said. “I reiterated my strong support for his leadership during this historic and challenging time for our nation.”

Mr. Bush said the defense secretary had helped to transform the United States military into a force “fully prepared to confront the dangerous threats of the 21st century” and had, along with the leaders of the services, taken the fight to terrorists on many fronts.

They’re all going to hell in the same handbasket.

These two guys hate each other, right? Then why is it that everyone else is doing all the dying?

James Westhead - BBC
Planning the US ‘Long War’ on terror

It sounds eerily like the Cold War - and that is no mistake.

The “Long War” is the name Washington is using to rebrand the new world conflict, this time against terrorism.

Now the US military is revealing details of how it is planning to fight this very different type of war.

It is also preparing the public for a global conflict which it believes will dominate the next 20 years.

The nerve centre of this war against terror is the huge MacDill airbase in Tampa, Florida.

Surrounded by white sand beaches, palm trees and two golf courses it looks more like a holiday camp than a military camp.

But inside US Central Command (Centcom) generals are planning what they call “fourth-generational warfare”.

Centcom is already responsible for operations in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa - as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - and now it is planning a campaign that will eventually span the globe.

Aiming at al-Qaeda

The man behind what the US military calls its “principles of the Long War” is Brig Gen Mark Kimmitt.

Gen Kimmitt, Centcom’s deputy director of plans and strategy, told BBC News: “Even if Iraq stabilised tomorrow the Long War would continue.”

So as Centcom tries to control events in Iraq, he is also planning a strategy for “nothing less than the defeat of al-Qaeda across the world and its associated movements strung together by extremist ideology”.

To achieve victory the US military will have to change dramatically, he says.

Like the terrorists it will have to build international networks, Gen Kimmitt says, making better use of “soft power” - diplomacy, finance, trade and technology.

“I’m an artillery officer, and I can’t fire cannons at the internet,” he says, referring to what he sees as one of the key weapons of the modern age.

Instead, he argues that the US military must try to break down “old mind-sets and bureaucracies” and build new relationships with other agencies - like the FBI, the police and the state department - through what in military jargon are called “joint inter-agency task forces”.

Improved posture

The theory is that the military cannot fight alone against such a nimble and deadly foe as al-Qaeda, and must build a new kind of worldwide network as flexible and smart as its enemy.

As a result Gen Kimmitt predicts a much lower profile for traditional US forces.

He believes that will help win hearts and minds, by ending the impression that the US is occupying the Middle East.

“Our future posture is still being worked out,” he says.

“But I would like to see to the number of troops in the Middle East cut to a fraction of the current 300,000, by at least a half.”

The US military is planning a big increase in the role of special forces, the smaller, specially-trained teams able to speak local languages - including Arabic - deploy rapidly and work with the armies of other nations.

Trailer park diplomacy

Outside Centcom sits a symbol of the new approach and its complexity - a large trailer park with fluttering flags atop each trailer representing each of the 63 nations represented at Centcom, from Denmark to El Salvador.

Inside each trailer, a small team of military liaison officers shares information with their American colleagues and co-ordinates action in Iraq, Afghanistan and throughout the region.

According to an American general working with the coalition, the aim is to maintain this loose-knit arrangement to fight the global war on terror.

“We want to make it a lasting organisation,” he said.

“We don’t want it to dissolve like it did after Desert Shield and Desert Storm.”

However, America’s difficult relationship with some allies after 11 September 2001 suggests that this will be a challenge.

France and Germany, for example, opposed the war in Iraq. Rear Adm Jacques Mazars, the French representative at Centcom, says French and American forces co-operate more successfully on the ground than their politicians.

But, he said, running a coalition for a sustained period would be hard.

“On the conceptual level we can agree,” he said. “There will be a long war to be won. But on the practical level it will be harder.”

One regular cause of tension among the allies is the sharing of sensitive intelligence.

“There are some things you wouldn’t share with a neighbour and even an ally,” one senior US officer said.

There are signs that despite the difficulties, the new coalition against terror is here to stay.

The Pentagon admits its vision is not yet fully realised, but it has already started work on a new building in the MacDill complex, providing a bricks-and-mortar home for the international occupants of the trailer park.

“I can’t see there ever being a completely homogenous coalition dealing with worldwide terror,” said Col Mark Bibbey, the chief of staff of the British mission at Centcom. “The 63 nations are not signed up to the same view on everything.”

But he added: “You’ve got to start somewhere. You have to plan ahead. You have to be driving in a particular direction. If we don’t start driving now or soon, we’ll be behind the curve.”

Don’t believe this shit for a minute. We’ve been consistently at war ever since WWII. All this formal labeling does is give our administration a streamlined name for hanging their illegal wiretaps, warrentless searches and covert operations, while providing the media, publishing and entertainment industries a new topical issue to craft a narrative around.

Are the US Armed Forces currently optimized to combat a Cold War enemy? Sure. But the decentralized, agile, inconspicuous warfare that our current foes engage in has been around forever and we’ve been playing that game as well over the years. The only reason we don’t hang our hat on covert operations and the funding of rebellions that support our interests in other countries, is because that type of involvement isn’t viewed as honorable in the eyes of the civilized world.

State-sponsored or individually driven, terrorism is terrorism.

So we’re now formalizing on a name, while removing the “civil” formalities of warfare. We’ll continue to position our red coats around the world in formal lines of advancement, while sneaking in for the kill with our scrappy blue coats when the sun goes down and the townsfolk are asleep. Nothing has changed.

Why I started my Chomsky indulgence with Understanding Power and not this digestible gem I’ll never know.

Uncle Sam is a brilliant pocket reference of Noam Chomsky’s world view, specifically his unflinching criticism of US foreign policy. His genius with linguistics provides him the means to absolutely tear apart the propaganda surrounding isms, bringing the conversation and arguments back to the table of reality. By comparing declassified government files, public policy and geopolitical events occurring between the early 1940’s to 1992, Chomsky cuts directly through the posturing of the US to frame cause and effect in the struggle for global power.

The man is fearless. He critically deconstructs policy from within the sovereign US to expose the post-WWII new world order policies of US planners — clearly describing how the Third World has been shaped to remain the peasant working class via neo-Nazi techniques of torture and intimidation, satisfying the needs of the US investor class.

His arguments are completely lucid and relevant in today’s world, even though it was published in the early nineties. Want an example? Keep an eye on the US propaganda regarding the “left-wing rhetoric” of Hugo Chavez. The BBC is already picking up the US talking points of Venezuela elections being rigged. Chomsky describes these US tactics in detail.

Chomsky’s take on US indoctrination of its citizens to contributing productively to pure capitalism is classic, as he tackles complicit participants from the mainstream media to academia. Just as stinging is his perspective on the marginalization of 80% of our population, which reminded me a bit of the 5% Nation, but without the optimism.

Here’s a section about the US in a Rent-A-Thug role (remember, this was written during the original Gulf War conflict with George H.W. Bush in charge):

[…]

“In any confrontation, each participant tries to shift the battle to a domain in which it’s most likely to succeed. You want to lead with your strength, play your strong card. The strong card of the United States is force—so if we can establish the principle that force rules the world, that’s a victory for us. If, on the other hand, a conflict is settled through peaceful means, that benefits us less, because our rivals are just as good or better in that domain.

Diplomacy is a particularly unwelcome option, unless it’s pursued under the gun. The US has very little popular support for its goals in the Third World. This isn’t surprising, since it’s trying to impose structures of domination and exploitation. A diplomatic settlement is bound to respond, at least to some degree, to the interests of the other participants in the negotiation, and that’s a problem when your positions aren’t very popular.

As a result, negotiations are something the US commonly tries to avoid. Contrary to much propaganda, that has been true in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Central America for many years.

Against this background, it’s natural that the Bush administration should regard military force as a major policy instrument, preferring it to sanctions and diplomacy (as in the Gulf crisis). But since the US now lacks the economic base to impose “order and stability� in the Third World, it must rely on others to pay for the exercise—a necessary one, it’s widely assumed, since someone must ensure a proper respect for the masters. The flow of profits from Gulf oil production helps, but Japan and German-led continental Europe must also pay their share as the US adopts the “mercenary role,� following the advice of the international business press.

The financial editor of the conservative Chicago Tribune has been stressing these themes with particular clarity (William Neikirk, “We are the World’s Guardian Angelsâ€? 9/9/90) We must be “willing mercenaries,â€? paid for our ample services by our rivals, using our “monopoly powerâ€? in the “security marketâ€? to maintain “our control over the world economic system.â€? We should run a global protection racket, he advises, selling “protectionâ€? to other wealthy powers who will pay us a “war premium.”

This is Chicago, where the words are understood: if someone bothers you, you call on the Mafia to break their bones. And if you fall behind in your premium, your health may suffer too.

To be sure, the use of force to control the Third World is only a last resort. The IMF is a more cost-effective instrument than the Marines and the CIA if it can do the job. But the “iron fist� must be poised in the background, available when needed.

Our rent-a-thug role also causes suffering at home. All of the successful industrial powers have relied on the state to protect and enhance powerful domestic economic interests, to direct public resources to the needs of investors, and so on—one reason why they are successful. Since 1950, the US has pursued these ends largely through the Pentagon System (including NASA and the Department of Energy, which produces nuclear weapons). By now we are locked into these devices for maintaining electronics, computers and high-tech industry generally.

Reaganite military Keynesian excesses added further problems. The transfer of resources to wealthy minorities and other government policies led to a vast wave of financial manipulations and a consumption binge. But there was little in the way of productive investment, and the country was saddled with huge debts: government, corporate, household and the calculable debt of unmet social needs as the society drifts towards a Third World pattern, with islands of great wealth and privilege in a sea of misery and suffering.

When a state is committed to such policies, it must somehow find a way to divert the population, to keep them from seeing what’s happening around them. There are not many ways to do this. The standard ones are to inspire fear of terrible enemies about to overwhelm us, and awe for our grand leaders who rescue us from disaster in the nick of time.

That has been the pattern right through the 1980’s, requiring no little ingenuity as the standard device, the Soviet threat, became harder to take seriously. So the threat to our existence has been Qaddafi and his hordes of international terrorists, Grenada and its ominous air base, Sandinistas marching on Texas, Hispanic narcotraffickers led by the arch-maniac Noriega, and crazed Arabs generally. Most recently it’s Saddam Hussein, after he committed his sole crime—the crime of disobedience—in August 1990. It has become more necessary to recognize what has always been true: that the prime enemy is the Third World, which threatens to get “out of control.�

These are not laws of nature. The processes, and the institutions that engender them, could be changed. But that will require cultural, social and institutional changes of no little movement, including democratic structures that go far beyond periodic selection of representatives of the business world to manage domestic and international affairs.”

[…]

Exactly.

Okay, I’m off to read Cluetrain again. I call this “gray matter iteration.” ;-)